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Abstract 
 
 Students face four decision margins: (a) How many years to spend in school, (b) What to 
study. (c) How much effort to devote to learning per year and (d) Whether to disrupt or assist the 
learning of classmates.    This paper reviews an emerging economic literature on the effects of 
and determinants of student effort and cooperativeness (c and d above) and how putting 
student motivation and behavior at center of one’s theoretical framework changes one’s view of 
how schools operate and how they might be made more effective.   In this new framework 
students have a dual role.  They are both (1) investors/ consumers who choose which goals to 
focus on and how much effort to put into each goal and (b) workers getting instruction and 
guidance from their first-line supervisors, the teachers.  I present a simple model where the 
behavior of students, teachers and administrators depends on the incentives facing them and the 
actions of the other actors in the system.  The incentives, in turn, depend upon the cost and 
reliability of the information (signals) that is generated about the various inputs and outputs of the 
system.   
 Our review of empirical research support many of the predictions of the model. Student 
effort, engagement and discipline vary a lot within schools, across schools and across nations 
and have significant effects on learning.   Higher extrinsic rewards for learning are associated 
the taking of more rigorous courses, teachers setting higher standards and more time devoted 
to homework.  Taking more rigorous courses and studying harder increase student 
achievement.  Post World War II trends in study effort and course rigor are positively correlated 
with achievement trends.   
 Even though, greater rigor improves learning, parents and students prefer easy teachers.  
They pressure tough teachers to lower standards and sign up for courses taught by easy graders.  
Curriculum-based external exit examinations improve the signaling of academic achievement to 
colleges and the labor market and this increases extrinsic rewards for learning.   Cross section 
studies suggest that CBEEES result in greater focus on academics, more tutoring of lagging 
students, more homework and higher levels of achievement.   Minimum competency examinations 
do not have significant effects on learning or dropout rates but they do appear to have positive 
effects on the reputation of high school graduates.  As a result, students from MCE states earn 
significantly more than students from non-MCE states and the effect lasts at least eight years.    
 Students who attend schools with studious well-behaved classmates learn more.  
Disruptive students generate negative production externalities and cooperative hard-working 
students create positive production externalities.  Norms of student peer cultures often encourage 
student disruptions and harass nerds.  In addition, learning is poorly signaled to employers and 
colleges.  Thus, market signals and the norms of student peer culture do not internalize the 
externalities that are pervasive in school settings and as a result, students typically devote less 
effort to studying than the parents and the public would wish.       
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 The theory of human capital provides a unified explanation of why students invest in 
education, how much and what type of education and training they choose and how these 
investments determine an individual’s future productivity and earnings.  This very fruitful theory has 
been the stimulus for thousands of studies assessing student incentives to stay in school, the 
returns to years of schooling, to field of study, to type of school attended, school quality and to 
employer training, the sources of variation in these returns and who chooses to get different 
amounts and types of schooling and training (Freeman 1986, Card 1999, Heckman 2003, other 
papers written for this handbook volume.)   
 Human capital theory, however, has seldom been applied to studying the educational 
process itself or the internal workings of schools.  Economists have instead employed a production 
function paradigm. Conventionally, test scores measuring academic achievement are the outputs, 
school administrators are the managers, teachers the labor input and students are goods in 
process.  But a research program that treats students as the object of the actions of teachers and 
administrators has inherent limitations.  Learning requires active participation of the learner.  
Students or parents choose the difficulty level—honors, regular college prep or remedial—of 
courses.  If typical classes have twenty-five students, the students are spending at least 25 times 
as many hours trying to learn (or possibly choosing not to try) as teachers are spending teaching.  
They decide whether to skip school, how much effort to devote to each course and whether to help 
or obstruct the learning of others in the class.  On any given day in 1900 twenty-eight percent of 
enrolled students were absent from school.  By 1997-98 absenteeism had dropped to 7 percent, 
but in some states it reached 15 percent (NCES 2000a, Table 38, 41, 43).  Studies of time use in 
classrooms have found that American students actively engage in a learning activity for only about 
half the time they are scheduled to be in school.  A study of schools in Chicago found that public 
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schools with high-achieving students averaged about 75 percent of class time for actual 
instruction.  For schools with low achieving students, the average was 51 percent of class time 
(Frederick, 1977).  Overall, Frederick, Walberg and Rasher (1979) estimated 46 percent of the 
potential learning time is lost due to absence, lateness, inattention, classroom disruptions or 
teachers being off task.  
  Time devoted to homework also varies a great deal.  In 1998, 21 percent of high school 
seniors reported doing 10 or more hours of homework per week, while another 23 percent reported 
not being assigned homework or not doing the homework assigned (NCES, Condition… 2001b, p. 
41).  Studies have found that learning has a strong relationship with time on task (Wiley 1986; 
Walberg 1992), time devoted to homework (Cooper 1989; Betts 1996) and the share of homework 
that is completed.   Differentials in time committed to learning are likely to be an important reason 
for variations in achievement across students, across schools and across nations.   
 Just as important as the time devoted to learning is the student's engagement in the 
process.    John Goodlad (1983) study of American high schools described: "a general picture of 
considerable passivity among students... (p. 113)".   Asked “How often does your mind wander” 
during class, 23 percent of a large sample of American middle school and high school students 
said “usually” or “always,” while 33 percent said “seldom” or “never”.  (Educational Excellence 
Alliance 2002).”1  Sixty-two percent of 10th graders agreed with the statement, "I don't like to do 
any more school work than I have to" (Longitudinal Survey of American Youth or LSAY, Q. 
AA37N).   
 A second problem with the education production function literature is its failure to deal with 
the fact that academic achievement (as assessed by math, science and reading tests) is just one of 
the many goals that schools are expected to serve.   Many studies use math test scores as the 
sole measure of output even though elementary students spend less than a quarter of their time 
doing math and high school students spend only 14 percent of their time in math classes.   Non-
academic courses account for 35 percent of credits earned in American high schools.   For 2000 
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graduates, personal use courses accounted for 11.1 percent of total credits, art and music for 7.8 
percent and vocational education for 16.2 percent of total credits earned (NCES, Digest of 
Education Statistics 2002, Table 139).  In multivariate models predicting earnings, credits taken in 
occupational specialties have significantly more positive effects on wages and earnings (both 
immediately and eight years after graduation) than academic credits (conditional on school 
attendance and years of schooling, Bishop and Mane 2003).  Non-academic goals—vocational 
training, developing artistic talent, discouraging drug use, learning teamwork, providing 
opportunities for physical exercise, developing respect and tolerance for others and community 
entertainment (eg. band, cheer leading and interscholastic sports), etc.-- are very important in the 
eyes of students and the community.   
 These two observations suggest that students play a dual role in schools. They are (1) 
investors/ consumers who choose which goals (outputs) to focus on and how much effort to put 
into each goal and (2) workers getting instruction and guidance from their first-line supervisors, the 
teachers.  Teachers also have a great deal of discretion over how much emphasis they place on 
various aspects of their subject and how they handle discipline and character development.  
Students must cooperate with the teacher and each other if educational goals are to be achieved.  
In practice this means that classroom goals are often negotiated between teacher and students 
(Sizer 1984; Powell, Cohen and Farrar 1985). The behavior of each of the system's actors 
(teachers, administrators, school board, parents, students and the leaders of student crowds) 
depends on the incentives facing them.  The incentives, in turn, depend upon the cost and 
reliability of the information (signals) that are generated about the various outputs and inputs of the 
system. 
 This paper focuses on the incentives faced by students, the effects of incentives on student 
behavior and the character and quality of the information about performance that generates these 
incentives.  Similar issues arise in modeling the behavior of teachers and school administrators.  I 
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point out the similarities as the analysis develops, but the focus is on student incentives, student 
norms and student behavior.   This review has five parts. 
 The first part of the paper presents evidence that student effort accounts for an important 
share of the variance across individuals and nations in student achievement.  The second part of 
the paper outlines a simple model of how students decide how much effort to put into their studies 
and how their decisions interact with public support for greater spending on education.  It also 
reviews evidence on the effects of extrinsic rewards for learning on student   effort, school quality 
and achievement.   The third part of the paper reviews the empirical literature on the effects of 
improved signaling of student achievement at the end of high school on the rewards for learning, 
on student effort, teacher’s standards and student achievement. The fourth part of the paper 
reviews studies of the effects of raising the standards for getting good grades, promotion to the 
next grade or a diploma.  The final section of the paper examines how externalities generated by 
peer effects and grading on a curve influence student peer culture and norms about study effort.  I 
then discuss two economic models of student peer groups and pressures--Akerlof and Kranton’s 
‘identity’ model and a model in which norms are signaled by the behavior of a crowd’s leaders and 
enforced by threats of harassment and social exclusion.   
 
I.   Student Effort Influences Learning 
  Not surprisingly students who do not pay attention in class and/or frequently skip school are 
poorer readers and less competent mathematicians than students who attend regularly and pay 
attention.   In the  Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) study (OECD, 2003a), the 
3.1 percent of American 15 year olds who had skipped five or more classes in the past two weeks 
scored slightly more than a standard deviation lower [approximately four U.S. grade-level 
equivalents (GLE)] on the PISA reading literacy assessment than the 55 percent of students who 
said they were attending regularly.   Data for 25 other countries on class skipping and the reading 
deficit of those who skip 5 or more classes is presented in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.2  The 
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reading deficit of students who skip a lot of classes is 79 points on average (about three-quarters of 
a standard deviation) in the other nations that participated in PISA-2000.   
  
 
Table 1 
Effort, Discipline and Achievement of Secondary School Students 
Share 
15-19 in 
School 
In 2001 
I often 
feel 
Bored 
Percent  
Schools 
With 
Absent 
eeism 
% who 
skipped
1 or 
more 
class 
Reading
Deficit 
Students
who 
Skipped 
Discipli-
nary 
Climate
 
Reading 
Diff betw. 
Top & 
Bottom 
Quartile
TIMSS 
End of 
HS 
TIMSS 
End of 
HS 
PISA 
age 15 
(Native- 
Born 
Students)
 
percent % Agree 
above 
5 % 
In last 2 
weeks 
5 or more 
classes 
Student 
Rept. 
On Disc. 
Climate Math Science 
Read 
ing Math
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Australia 81.1 60 76 43 46 -.09 47 522 527 532 536 
Austria 76.9 49 46 37 61 .19 41 518 520 515 523 
Belgium 91.0 46 35 28 108 -.12 10 --- --- 522 536 
Brazil 74.6 30 --- 53 52 -.34 -18 --- --- 398 337 
Canada 75.0 58 59 47 60 -.14 25 519 532 538 536 
Chile 67.8 -- -- 47 79 -.32 35 --- --- 411 384 
Czech Rep. 87.8 47 81 53 76 .14 55 466 487 501 504 
Denmark 82.9 41 41 49 37 -.20 27 547 509 504 520 
Finland 85.3 60 -- 43 42 -.16 9 --- --- 548 537 
France 86.6 32 28 34 100 -.05 16 523 487 512 523 
Germany 89.4 49 37 26 67 .10 48 495 497 507 510 
Hungary 79.0 29 45 33 64 .23 93 483 471 482 489 
Iceland 79.2 30 12 37 46 -.08 23 534 549 509 516 
Italy 72.2 54 --- 56 99 -.24 79 476 475 489 459 
Japan --- 32 5 10 na .49 92 --- --- 525 559 
Korea 79.3 46 5 20 35 .20 47 --- --- 525 547 
Mexico 41.0 28 --- 32 70 .17 4 --- --- 427 391 
N. Z. 73.0 60 80 44 92 -.15 24 522 529 538 543 
Norway 85.3 58 31 35 78 -.36 18 528 544 510 503 
Portugal 73.3 24 44 16 72 -.05 39 --- --- 472 456 
Russia 70.8 27 --- 34 34 .45 40 471 481 463 480 
Spain 80.1 66 26 33 71 -.17 30 --- --- 494 478 
Sweden 86.4 58 45 38 33 -.19 35 552 559 523 517 
Switzerland 83.3 38 13 32 56 .30 28 540 523 514 548 
U. K. 74.7 54 78 35 71 .02 45 --- --- 528 534 
United 
States 77.6 61 60 38 112 .03 31 461 480 511 500 
OECD Avg. 77.7 48 44 33 79 .00 39 --- --- 503 500 
Enrollment Rate (column. 1)--OECD, Education at a Glance, 2003,  p. 258. 
Bored in Class (column 2)-- OECD, Education at a Glance, 2002, p.330;  
School means of absenteeism (column 3)—OECD, Education at a Glance, 2000 p.241  
Class Skipping and Reading deficit (column 4 & 5)  Literacy Skills for the World of Tomorrow: Further Results from PISA 2000, 2003,  p.290 
Student reported Disciplinary Climate and it’s association with reading achievement (column 6 & 7) Literacy Skills for the World of Tomorrow: Further 
Results from PISA 2000, 2003, p.372. 
TIMSS Scores at end of secondary school for all students (column 8 & 9)--Gonzales,  Pursuing Excellence, p 92; 
PISA reading & math for 15 year old students from students who were born in the country to at least one parent from the country, (col. 10 & 11)  Literacy 
Skills for the World of Tomorrow: Further Results from PISA 2000,  p 351.
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PISA also found that student achievement was correlated with the disciplinary climate of 
the student’s classroom.  Column 6 of the table presents the mean value of PISA’s standardized 
index of a positive disciplinary climate.3  Column 7 presents the difference between the reading 
scores of students who reported few disruptions in their classes (top quartile of the index) and the 
scores of students who reported many disruptions [bottom quartile of the index].  The reading 
differential between students in classrooms with low and high levels of disruption varies a good 
deal across countries.  It is over 90 points for Hungary and Japan and under 10 points in Brazil, 
Finland and Mexico.  For the United States the differential is 31 points (about 1.2 grade level 
equivalents).    
 While these positive associations are consistent with the hypothesis that student effort and 
discipline improve achievement, the bi-variate relationships presented in table 1 exaggerate the 
magnitude of any causal relationship.   PISA has looked at the effect of disciplinary climate on 
achievement while controlling for many potentially confounding variables: student background, 
school SES, student-teacher ratios, teacher qualifications and student use of school resources 
(library, computers, internet and science labs).   They found that the “students are disciplined” 
index was a highly significant [ t statistics above 5.7] predictor of reading, mathematics and science 
achievement.  Numerous other studies also find that indicators of student effort such as 
absenteeism, paying attention, completing homework assignments and hours doing homework 
have significant effects on learning in multivariate models controlling for prior achievement and 
family background (e.g. Cooper 1989; Ehrenberg et al, 1991; Betts 1996, Williams and Somers 
2001, Bishop et al 2003).  Their importance in any given study will depend on how well effort and 
discipline are measured, whether complementary inputs such as quality instruction are being 
provided and the sensitivity of the achievement indicator to student effort levels.   
 Do variations in student effort and discipline across countries account for some of the large 
differences in average achievement levels?  Let’s look at the data in Table 1 columns 1-4 and 6 on 
how student effort and engagement varies across nations.  Column 1 reports the proportion of 15 
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to 19 year olds enrolled in school.  On this indicator the United States lags behind most of Western 
Europe, the Czech Republic, Korea and Hungary.  Column 2 presents a proxy for student 
engagement--the percent of students who say they “often feel bored” in school.  Sixty–one percent 
of American students say they are often bored.  The OECD average is 48 percent.  Lack of 
engagement seems to be a pretty universal problem.  Column 3 reports the percentage of schools 
in a nation that have absenteeism rates exceeding 5 percent.  Here there are big differences 
across nations.   Absenteeism is above five percent for 60 percent of American schools, 76 percent 
of Australian schools and 80 percent of New Zealand schools but only 5 percent of Japanese and 
Korean schools.  Class skipping was also much lower in Japan and Korea and student discipline 
was better as well (see columns 4 and 6).   Possibly this is the explanation for the remarkably high 
achievement levels of students in East Asia: students are more disciplined in class and study 
harder.    
 To test this hypothesis, an effort/discipline scale combining the PISA student discipline 
index (column 6) and the school skipping data in column 4 was created and then included in 
models predicting PISA literacy scales for native-born students.    The achievement of native-born 
students is analyzed in order to eliminate variation in rates of immigration as a confounding 
variable.  The base line model has two variables: GDP per capita (to capture national wealth, the 
socio-economic background of parents and the efficiency of the nation’s institutions) and a dummy 
variable for East Asia intended to capture cultural differences between East and West that produce 
the remarkable work ethic of Asian students.  This dummy variable has always been a significant 
predictor of mathematics and science achievement in my previous work.   Table 2 presents the 
results.    The effort/discipline index is a significant predictor of national mean achievement levels in 
mathematics and science.  A one-standard deviation (measured in the sample of 42 nations) 
improvement in both components of the index predicts a 14 point (about .50 U.S. GLE) higher level 
of science achievement and a 20 point (a .80 U.S. GLE) higher level in mathematics.  When the 
effort/discipline index is added to the model, the Asian dummy becomes insignificant.  Apparently 
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differentials in student effort and discipline do account for some of the differences between nations 
in academic achievement and contribute to the outstanding achievement levels of East Asian 
nations.    
Table 2 
Student Effort and Academic Achievement 
Program for International Student Assessment 2000 Data 
Native of the Country Effort Index 
Log GDP/
Pop 
1995 
East 
Asia 
Adj R2
RMSE 
#of 
Obs 
Mathematics 
—15 Yr Olds 
20.8*** 
(7.5) 
87.6*** 
(8.2) 
26.8 
(19.0) 
.746 
33.9 
41 
  86.3*** (8.9) 
52.8*** 
(17.9) 
.702 
36.7 
41 
Science 
—15 Yr Olds 
14.0** 
(6.4) 
70.6*** 
(7.0) 
26.9 
(16.2) 
.720 
29.0 
41 
  69.8*** 
(7.3) 
44.3*** 
(14.8) 
.721 
29.7 
41 
Combined Reading Literacy  —
15 Yr Olds 
4.5 
(5.6) 
76.8*** 
(6.1) 
20.8 
(14.2) 
.794 
25.3 
41 
  76.5*** 
(6.1) 
26.5** 
(12.1) 
.796 
25.2 
41 
Source: OECD, Literacy Skills for the World of Tomorrow: Further Results From PISA 2000, 
2003. 
  
We now turn to a discussion of policy options for inducing students to try harder.  We begin 
with a simple model that elucidates some of the key issues.   
 
II.   A Model of Student Learning 
 2.1 The Model of Student Effort  
 The student’s decision about effort in school can be simply represented by three equations: 
a learning function, a rewards for learning function and a costs of student effort function. 
 The Learning Function 
 Learning is a change that takes place in a person.  It occurs when an individual who is 
ready and able to learn, is offered an opportunity to learn and makes the effort to learn.  All three 
elements are essential.  Learning readiness and ability—indexed by Ai—depends on prior learning, 
intelligence and family background.   Ai is exogenous (i.e. determined outside the model).  The part 
of the learning equation controlled by individual students is effort (Ei).   
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 While, in principle, every literate individual with access to a library or the internet has the 
opportunity to learn, schools and teachers have, in practice, a great deal of influence on what 
youngsters learn and at what pace.  Educators determine what courses are required, the topics 
covered, teaching methods, homework and paper assignments and classroom expectations.  In 
the model opportunity to learn is operationalized as IXm or school quality.  Xm is per pupil 
expenditure on school inputs and policies that foster academic achievement for the school ‘m’.  I is 
an exogenous efficiency parameter for these school inputs/policies.   While facilitating academic 
learning is the primary purpose of American schools, other goals (sports, art, music, occupational 
skills, developing character and teamwork, equality of opportunity, etc) compete for school 
resources and administrative attention.  Consequently, Xm is not the same thing as per pupil 
expenditure.   
  The fourth input in the individual’s learning function is the effort and cooperativeness of the 
other students at the school.  Empirical studies of peer effects and social interactions have 
generated persuasive evidence that individuals are influenced by the norms and behavior of 
coworkers and close associates.  Education value-added production function studies 
consistently find that the socio-economic status of the other students in a school influences an 
individual’s learning.  Until recently it was not clear, however, whether this finding reflected a 
causal relationship or was instead a selection effect caused by parents with strong preferences 
for education choosing to move to high SES communities.  Recent studies based on data free 
from such bias show that causal peer effects do exist.  Randomly assigned college roommates 
have been shown to influence each other’s academic performance (Zimmerman 1999; 
Sacerdote 2000).   An elegant study by Carolyn Hoxby (2000) has shown that boys and girls 
learn more when girls account for a larger share of the students in a grade. Angrist and Lang’s 
(2002) study of Brookline schools found that increasing the number of Boston Metco students in 
a classroom did not affect the learning of white students but had significant negative effects on 
learning of Black 3rd graders who were Brookline residents.  Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin’s (2002) 
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analysis of Texas data found that high ability Black students learned more in years in which their 
grade had a higher proportion of non-black students. Using experimental data from Project Star, 
Boozer and Cacciola (2001) have demonstrated that the students who were taught in small 
classes during their first years in school had positive spillover effects on their classmates in 
regular third and fourth grade classrooms once the experiment was completed.  Using panel 
evidence from administrative data, Julian Betts and Andrew Zau (2002) found that “changes in 
the average achievement at the school have independent large effects on student learning.” 
These effects were substantially larger than the effects of class size and teacher credentials, 
education and experience.  Uribe, Murnane and Willett’s (2003) analysis of data from Bogota 
Columbia obtains similar results. 
 These studies are strong evidence that peer effects are real.   But before peer spillover 
effects can be manipulated to further learning, we must understand exactly how they are 
generated.   The SES, skin color and gender of classmates probably do not directly influence 
learning.  Rather the observed spillover effects are probably generated by the norms and behavior 
of classmates.  Some students help their classmates learn, others disrupt their learning.  Some 
honor academic engagement, others make fun of kids who are friendly with teachers.   The norms 
and behavior patterns of young women are more supportive of academic learning than the norms 
and behavior patterns of young men.  This is probably the reason for Hoxby’s gender composition 
findings.   
 There are two distinct ways that peers influence a student’s learning.  First, their behavior 
influences how much classroom time is devoted to maintaining discipline and to other distractions, 
how much is learned from classroom discussions and projects that students work on together, 
how rapidly teachers move through the curriculum and how many students require one-on-one 
assistance.  These influences are production externalities and are represented in our model by 
including average effort levels of other students as one of the inputs in the individual’s learning 
production function.  Lazear has demonstrated that when students are heterogeneous with 
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respect to disruptive behavior, it is optimal for more disruptive students to be placed in smaller 
classes (2001).   
 The second mechanism by which peers influence learning outcomes is the effect of their 
norms and teasing and harassment behavior on the individual’s own effort level.  A discussion 
of these influences is postponed to section 5. 
 To keep the model simple, years attending K-12 schools are assumed to be 
predetermined.  The learning that occurs during that period is described by the simple equation:  
(1) Human Capital at the end of secondary school =  
L = A  Eα Emρ(IXm)ß        α+ ρ+ß < 1 
 
where E = Effort of the individual student—an index of the time and psychic energy that the “i th” 
pupil devotes to learning [years spent in K–12 school are taken as predetermined] 
 Em = Mean effort of all other students at school ‘m’—an index of the time and psychic 
energy that the other pupils at school ‘m’ annually devote to learning  
 Xm = Expenditure on school inputs and policies that foster academic achievement at school 
‘m’.  This is not equivalent to spending per pupil because school budgets contain 
items serving other purposes—e.g. sports, art, music, occupational skills, character, 
teamwork, etc.  
 I  =  An exogenous efficiency parameter for school inputs that foster academic achievement   
   α = elasticity of the “i’ th student’s human capital (L) with respect to her effort. 
ρ = elasticity of the “i’ th student’s human capital (L) with respect to the effort of all other 
students in the school.  ρ is also referred to as the effort externality 
multiplier. 
 ß = elasticity of the ‘i’th student’s human capital (L) with respect to (IXm). 
Note that the ‘i’ superscript has been suppressed throughout.  While the choice of a Cobb-
Douglas function is more specific than is necessary to reach the conclusions of the model, the 
main intuition and results of the model can readily be followed in this specific functional form.4  It 
implies that: 
(a) School quality and student effort interact positively.  An improvement in teacher quality 
enhances the effect of greater student effort and vice versa.   
(b) Effort by one student interacts positively with the effort of classmates.  (e.g. One student 
can disrupt the learning of an entire class).  
(c) A 20 percent increase in effort by all students (E and Em) and school quality (Xm) 
increases human capital (L) by less than 20 percent. 
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 The Private Rewards for Achievement Function 
 The model assumes that young people have high rates of time preference, so the present 
discounted value of future payoffs is heavily influenced by the signals of L that are available to 
colleges and employers immediately after high school.5  An individual’s productivity depends on L, 
a latent variable that is not visible to college admissions officers and employers.  When a student 
leaves high school, colleges and employers potentially have four indicators they can use to predict 
L: (1) aptitude and family background (A), (2) achievement relative to others at the school such as 
class rank or GPA (L –Lm), (3) a pass/fail dummy variable for a minimum competency exam (MCE) 
and/or (4) a vector of scores on curriculum-based external exit exams (CBEEES).  Students are 
pooled across schools.6   L is positively correlated with both A and (L –Lm) and even more strongly 
correlated with scores on CBEEEs when they have been taken.     
 2) Present Discounted Value of Intrinsic and Extrinsic (both Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary)  
    Rewards for Achievement = Π  = (j +w )L + θ(L –Lm) + σA  where  
j  = the present discounted value of the intrinsic non-pecuniary benefits, joy, of learning 
received by the ‘i’ th student and her parents.  Note that these benefits are assumed 
to occur regardless of whether the learning is signaled to others or honored publicly.   
 
 w  = the impact of absolute levels of achievement (human capital) at the end of secondary 
school on the present discounted value of lifetime after–tax earnings and other 
extrinsic rewards for learning for person ‘i’. It includes the effects of secondary 
school learning on wage rates conditional on years of schooling and on the years 
and quality of postsecondary schooling obtained.  It also includes the benefits that 
parents derive from the economic success of their children and the honor and 
prestige given to those who are signaled to be high achievers.  The magnitude of 
these benefits increase when L is more reliably signaled to colleges and employers 
(Becker and Rosen 1992). Curriculum-based external examinations increase w, the 
payoff to absolute achievement, and tend to reduce θ, the payoff to one’s relative 
position (rank) in the secondary school’s graduating class, and σ the payoff to IQ 
and family background.  The introduction of an MCE has a similar but smaller effect 
on w, θ and σ .                            
 
 L–Lm = Achievement of the ‘i’th student relative to the representative student’s achievement 
(Lm).  Rank in class and grades awarded on a curve are examples of signals of 
achievement that describe the student’s achievement relative to others in the 
school. 
 
θ  = the impacts of achievement relative to the school mean (e.g. effects of class rank and 
grades assigned on a curve) on social status in the community, admission to 
preferred colleges and lifetime income.  
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 σ = the impact of Ai (i.e. Early IQ, early achievement and family background) on the 
present discounted value of lifetime earnings. σ will be large and w and θ small if 
access to college depends solely on family background and IQ test scores obtained 
prior to entering secondary school.  The SAT is not a pure IQ test, but relative to 
curriculum based exams it is at the aptitude end of the spectrum.  Consequently, 
substituting curriculum-based exams for the SAT in university admissions decisions 
would lower σ  and raise w.  Since A is assumed exogenous, changes in σ  have 
only second order effects on student incentives to study or community incentives to 
invest in schools. 
   
Choosing Learning Effort 
 Students compare expected benefits to expected costs.     
 3) Benefits of Effort for student ‘i’ =   
B = (j +w+θ)[AEα Emρ(IXm)ß]  –  θ[Am Emα+ρ(IXm)ß] 
where Lm = Am Emα+ρ(IXm)ß 
 
≈   human capital at graduation of the representative student at school ‘m’.    
Am is the ability of this representative student. 
 
 Studying generates costs—psychic energy, loss of free time and boredom—that are 
assumed to be an increasing function of the time and energy devoted to schoolwork:   
4) Costs of Student Effort = 
C = C0E
µ  where µ > 1 
because the marginal costs of effort rise as effort increases. 
 
 Determining Student Effort 
  To study the determinants of student effort, we define a net benefits of study effort 
equation, B – C, and obtain it’s maximum by differentiating with respect to E, assuming Xm and Em 
fixed.  
 5) max  B-C = ( j+w + θ)[AEα Emρ(IXm)ß]   –  θ[Am Emα+ρ(IXm)ß]   – C0Eµ  
The derivative of (5) with respect to E for each student is: 
 
  6) 
( )
E
CB
∂
−∂
= α( j+w+θ)[AEα–1Emρ(IXm)ß] – µC0Eµ–1 = 0 
7) E = { [α/µC0][ j +w +θ][Am Emρ(IXm)ß] }1/(µ–α) 
 
 8)   ( )[ ])X( + lnE+A +C
-
1 = E mm 0 Ilnlnwjlnlnlnln βρθµααµ +++−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
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The policy implications of equations 7 and 8 are straight forward.  To induce students to 
study longer and harder, educators, employers and parents must either:  
• Lower the opportunity costs of studying ( 0Cµ↓ ), e.g. by requiring that homework be 
completed before television or a video game is turned on or establishing homework 
clubs after school. 
• Increase the effectiveness of study time (↑ α ), e.g. by providing a quiet place to study, 
learning aids (such as encyclopedias, computers and the internet) and 
tutoring/assistance if needed. 
• Improve the quality of one’s peers (↑ Em ), e.g. by moving to a higher income 
community or  getting your child into honors courses or a school or program for the 
‘gifted.’ 
• Improve the quality of instruction (↑ IXm), e.g. by developing excellent courses and 
curricula, hiring gifted teachers, providing excellent professional development and 
holding them accountable. 
• Increase intrinsic rewards for learning ( )j↑  e.g. by hiring more interesting teachers, 
making content more engaging, allowing students to select the course they take and 
instilling a love of learning in children.  
• Increase extrinsic rewards for learning ↑ ( )θ+w  e.g. by awarding merit scholarships 
and greater social prestige to high achievers, persuading employers to offer bigger 
wage increments immediately after high school for skills and for college completion 
and persuading colleges to become more selective and admit students into 
competitive programs on the basis of learning during high school (L), not ability (A), 
family background or ability to pay tuition. 
 
 2.2   Model of Government Effort 
 To determine the government's choice of the level of spending Xm, we have to look at the 
benefits and costs of the government G.  The government's benefits BG are given by:  
 9) ( )βρ mmmmmmmmG IXaEAwjPLwjPB ++=+= )()(   . 
 Assuming for simplicity no external benefits of education, the average intrinsic rewards for 
learning for students at school ‘m’ (jm) and the average extrinsic rewards (wm) for L are equivalent 
for the individual student and for the general public.  Note, however, that the rewards for learning 
generated by a student’s high rank relative to other students at the school, θ, that motivate some 
students to excel are not found in the community’s payoff function.   Note further that the mean 
community benefits, (jm+wm)L, of learning are weighted by the parameter P  which reflects the 
priority government gives to the quality of a school’s academic program.  P characterizes the 
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political power of supporters of high academic standards in the governance of schools relative to 
the political power of those whose objectives lie elsewhere.  
 The government’s cost CG is defined as expenditure per pupil on the academic goals of 
school:  
 10) C XG = m. 
 Note that Xm is the choice variable under the control of the government. To keep things 
simple, I assume the other goals of schooling are sought independently.  It chooses Xm in order to 
maximize its net benefits (BG –CG), given students' effort and the institutional setting.   After 
reorganizing the first order condition for a maximum, we have the following equation for 
government effort. 
 11) Xm   = { ß P [ jm +wm][Am Ema+ρ Iß] }1/(– ß ) 
 An examination of equation (11) characterizing government effort reveals that public 
investments in the quality and quantity of academic instruction (Xm) are driven by many of the same 
forces—intrinsic and extrinsic rewards for learning, school efficiency (I), the elasticity of learning 
with respect to inputs--as student decisions to study hard (Bishop and Wößmann 2003).   Em is on 
the right hand side of (11) implying that diligence and engagement on the part of students tends to 
induce taxpayers to fund schools more generously.   Note also that Xm is on the right hand side of 
the student effort equation implying that politically powerful parents who obtain generous funding of 
the school’s academic program find that the students attending their local school will become more 
engaged and diligent.   These positive feedbacks mean that policy multipliers for the equilibrium of 
this system are quite large (Bishop and Wößmann 2003).  As a result, decentralized governance 
and funding is likely to result in Matthew effects.  Schools with politically powerful parents and able 
students who believe rewards for learning are large will significantly outperform schools with 
politically weak parents and disadvantaged students who dislike academics.  If a society with a 
decentralized education system wants to equalize achievement outcomes across schools, it must 
establish compensatory systems of financing, teacher assignment and/or student assignment. 
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One important exception to the generalization that Xm and E are driven by the same forces 
is the absence of θ, the payoff to class rank, in the equation for school quality investments.  If 
selective colleges admit students solely on the basis of class rank (ie. θ is large and (j+w)= 0), 
some students will be motivated to try to do better than their classmates, but parents will see no 
benefit to introducing more rigorous courses and hiring more qualified teachers. 
2.3 Evidence that Extrinsic Rewards Matter 
What evidence is there for the claim that student effort responds to extrinsic rewards?  
When students are asked why they study, 79 percent say “I need the grades to get into college.” 
and 58 percent say “Help me get a good job (EEA Survey, 2002).”  A randomized experiment in 
Kenya found that girls who were told that they would receive a large cash grant and free tuition if 
they scored well on an exam at the end of the year scored about .25 standard deviations higher on 
the exam (Kremer, Miguel and Thornton 2003).  Generous merit scholarship programs provide a 
natural experiment for evaluating the effects of pecuniary incentives.  Studies have found that the 
$3000+ Hope Scholarship for Georgia high school graduates with averages of B or better 
increased SAT scores, GPAs and college attendance rates relative to other states in the South 
(Henry and Rubenstein 2002; Dynarski, 2000; Cromwell, Mustard and Sridhar 2003).  When the 
payoff to college rises, college attendance rates rise.  When payoffs fall, attendance falls (Freeman 
1975, 1976, 1986; Bishop 1977).  Preparations for college during high school appear to be similarly 
responsive?   College-high school pay differentials in the regional labor market surrounding a high 
school had significant effects on the academic orientation of students’ courses and their likelihood 
of going to college (Bishop 1991).    
For students planning on college, the key determinants of the extrinsic rewards for study 
( )θ+w  are how important high school learning is for getting into and completing college and the 
payoff to getting a college degree.  For those not planning to go to college, better jobs are the 
relevant pecuniary inducement for study.  During the last fifty years, these indicators of the payoff 
to effort and learning in high school have tended to rise and fall together.  Lets review their history 
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and then compare that history to trends in the academic focus of schools, student effort and 
achievement.   
Wage Premium for College:  The college wage premium for 25 to 34 year old men and 
women rose during the 1950s, stabilized during the 1960s, then fell precipitously during the early 
1970s, stabilized again for 5 years at a low level and then climbed rapidly during the 1980s and 
more slowly during the 1990s (Census Bureau 1974; NCES, 2002b, Table 16.1).    
College Selectivity:  During the 1930s social class was the primary determinant of who 
went to college.   College entrants in 1929 were on average at the 55th percentile of ability among 
high school graduates.  Those who did not enter college were at the 44th percentile on average; a 
gap of only 11 points.  The percentile gap between college entrants and high school graduates not 
going to college rose to 15 points in 1934, 20 points in 1946, 19 points in 1950, 22 points in 1957, 
28 points in 1960 Project Talent data (Taubman and Wales 1972).  The trend toward growing 
academic selectivity of college enrollment reversed during the 1960s and early 1970s.  Many 2-
year colleges with open admissions policies were founded and males attended college in record 
numbers to postpone being drafted.  The class rank gap between those who attend college and 
those who do not fell to 21 points in 1972.  During the late 1970s the relationship grew stronger 
(reaching 24.7 points in 1980) (Bishop 1991). 
Wage Payoff for Academic Achievement:  In the United States, reading and math skills 
have historically not had large effects on the wage rates of young workers who have not gone to 
college (Bishop 1985).  Even so, the payoffs to these skills appeared to decline during late 
1960s and early 1970s.  The threat of litigation brought under the 1971 Griggs interpretation of 
Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1965 induced many employers to stop using tests assessing 
reading and mathematics to help in the selection of new employees (Friedman and Williams 
1982).  As a result, during the 1970s young high school graduates who had learned English, 
science and mathematics thoroughly typically did not earn appreciably more than the high 
school graduates who had done poorly in these subjects (Bishop 1985, 1989, 1993).  Individuals 
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who have strong mathematics skills and good grades in high school are better employees (Dept. 
of Labor 1970, Ghiselli 1973; Hunter, Crossen and Friedman 1985, Hartigan and Wigdor 1989, 
Bishop 1992).   Over time employers learn which employees are the most competent by observing 
job performance and greater productivity is eventually recognized and rewarded though it often 
takes a decade or so (Hauser and Daymont 1977; Taubman and Wales 1975; Bishop 1992; 
Farber and Gibbons 1996, Grubb 1994, Bishop 1990, Altonji and Pierett, 1998).   
 The environment changed during the 1980s and 90s due to the spread of personal 
computers and the rapid growth of professional-technical and managerial jobs.  The Supreme 
Court’s Wards Cove decision made it easier to defend using reading and mathematics tests as part 
of a selection process and some employers reintroduced basic skills tests into their selection 
procedures for clerical and factory jobs.  As a result, the labor market rewards for mathematical 
ability of young workers rose.  Murnane, Willett and Levy (1994) found that the effect of a one 
standard deviation increase in mathematics skill on the wage rates of 24 year old men rose from 
$0.46 per hour in 1978 to $1.15 per hour in 1986.  The wage payoff for young women rose from 
$1.15 per hour to 1.42 per hour in 1986.  
 The Bishop/ Wößmann model predicts that the rise during the 1980s and 90s in the payoff 
to college and to mathematics achievement should have stimulated schools to set higher 
standards and induced students to study harder.  Many states increased the number of 
mathematics and science courses required for graduation and established minimum competency 
tests for graduation.  Students are taking more rigorous courses.  Between 1982 and 2000 the 
share of students taking Geometry rose by 31 percentage points, Algebra II by 28 percentage 
points, Chemistry by 30 points and Physics by 16 points (NCES 2002a p. 164).  The number of 
students taking AP calculus quintupled.  Homework assigned and completed increased.  Hofferth 
and Sandberg (2000) report that 9 to 12 year old students in the U.S. averaged 3 hours and 41 
minutes of homework per week in 1997, a 9 percent increase since 1981.  The percentage of 13 
year olds reporting they either had no homework or did not do it fell from 33 percent in 1982 to 9 
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percent in 1990.  The percentage of 17 year olds reporting they did at least one hour of homework 
each day rose from 32.5 percent in 1978 to 66 percent in 1990 (NCES 1993 p. 122, 351).    
 As predicted, achievement improved.  NAEP reading scores in 1999 were two grade level 
equivalents (GLEs) higher than in 1980 for African-American and Hispanic 17 year olds.  For 
whites the gain on the reading tests was only 0.2 GLEs.    NAEP math scores were up one grade 
level equivalent (GLE) since 1982 for whites, two GLEs for African-Americans and 1.6 GLEs for 
Hispanics.  SAT scores were flat in verbal and up by 24 points in math.   NAEP science scores 
rose 1.3 GLE’s for whites, 1.9 GLE’s for African-Americans and 2.7 GLE’s for Hispanics (NCES 
2001b).    
  These positive trends contrast with the trends of the previous decade--the late 1960s and 
the 1970s when college selectivity and payoffs to learning and college attendance were declining.  
During the 1970s the summed math and verbal SAT-1 declined 50 points.  Scores of Iowa 12th 
graders on the Iowa Test of Educational Development which had risen steadily during the 1940s, 
1950s and the first half of the 1960s,   declined by more than a grade level equivalent after 1966 
(Bishop 1989).    
 There may, however, be other explanations for the post 1966 test score decline and the 
rebound during the 1980s and 1990s.  Graduation requirements and teacher expectations appear 
to have followed the same cycle.  While the Bishop/Woesmann theory explains these changes in 
teacher expectations and school policies as responses to shifts in economic payoffs, others might 
argue the causes lie elsewhere.  As a result, the examination of aggregate time series data for just 
one country can never be conclusive evidence for the changing economic payoffs hypothesis.  
Other data need to be examined.   The quality and reliability of signals of academic achievement 
can have big effects on extrinsic rewards for learning, w and θ.    We turn now to a review of 
evidence on how mechanisms for signaling student achievement influence academic achievement 
(L), public investment in student learning, Xm and student effort (E, Em ). 
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III.   The Effects of Better Signaling of Academic Achievement 
 In most European and Asian nations externally set high school exit exams assessing the 
secondary school curriculum determine university admission and access to preferred fields of 
study.  Grades on these exams are requested on job applications and typically included on 
resumes.   Consequently, curriculum-based external exit exam systems (CBEEES) like the 
Baccalaureate in France and the GCSE and A levels in England and Wales have profound 
effects on student incentives to study.  What are the critical features of a CBEEES?  How are 
they different from the minimum competency exams (MCE) that so many American states have 
established?   We begin by noting the features that MCEs and CBEEES have in common.  
They: 
1. Produce signals of accomplishment that have real consequences for the 
student.  MCEs are tests that must be passed to get a regular high school diploma.  For 
CBEEES the nature and the magnitude of the rewards vary.  In Canada CBEEE grades are 
averaged with teacher assessments to generate final grades for specific courses.  In 
Europe and East Asia exam results influence hiring decisions of employers and access to 
popular lines of study in university that are oversubscribed.  CBEEES sometimes make one 
eligible for a more prestigious diploma or confer rights to enroll in higher level post-
secondary institutions.  
2. Define achievement relative to an external standard, not relative to other 
students in the classroom or the school.  Fair comparisons of achievement across 
schools and across students taught by different teachers are now possible.7  Costrell's 
(1994, 1997) analysis of the optimal setting of educational standards when students from 
schools with different grading standards are pooled concluded that centralized standard 
setting (state or national achievement exams) with a local option to set even higher 
standards results in higher standards, higher achievement and higher social welfare than 
decentralized standard setting (ie. teacher grading or school defined graduation 
requirements). 
3. Are controlled by the education authority that establishes the curriculum for 
and funds K-12 education.   When a national or provincial ministry of education sponsors 
an external exam, it is more likely to be aligned with the national or provincial curriculum.  It 
is, consequently, more likely to be used for school accountability; not just as an instrument 
of student accountability.  Curriculum reform is facilitated because coordinated changes in 
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instruction and exams are feasible.  Tests established and mandated by other 
organizations serve the interests of other masters.  America’s most influential high stakes 
exams--the SAT-I and the ACT—serve the needs of colleges to sort students by aptitude 
not the needs of high schools to reward students who have learned what schools are trying 
to teach. 
4. Cover the vast majority of students.  Exams for a set of elite schools or 
advanced courses influence standards at the top but may have limited effects on the rest of 
the students. 
Curriculum-based external exit exam systems are distinguished from MCEs by the 
following additional features.  CBEEES:  
5. Assess a major portion of what students are expected to know or be able to 
do.  Studying to prepare for an exam (whether set by one’s own teacher or by a ministry of 
education) should result in the student learning important material and developing valued 
skills.  Some exit exams do a better job of achieving this goal than others.  Dimensions of 
achievement that cannot be reliably assessed by external means should be evaluated by 
teachers.  
6. Are collections of End-of-Course Exams (EOCE).  This requires that the Ministry 
of Education forge an agreement on minimum content standards for each subject that has 
an external exam.  Since they assess the content of specific sequences of courses, 
alignment between instruction and assessment is maximized and teacher accountability is 
enhanced.  This feature also aligns the interests of teachers, students and parents.  
Teachers become coaches helping their team do battle with the national or provincial 
exam.  Students should be less likely to pressure teachers to lower standards.  
7. Signal multiple levels of achievement in the subject.  If only a pass-fail signal is 
generated by an exam, the standard will, for political reasons, have to be set low enough to 
allow almost everyone to pass.  The achievement of most students will be so far above this 
level, the threat of failing the exam will not stimulate them to greater effort (Kang 1985; 
Becker and Rosen 1992; Costrell 1994; Betts and Costrell 2001). CBEEEs signal the 
student’s achievement level in the subject, not just whether the student exceeds or falls 
below a specific cut point that all high school graduates are required to surpass.   
Consequently all students, not just those at the bottom of the class, are given an 
incentive to study hard to do well on the exam (Becker and Rosen 1992).  Consequently, 
EOCE are hypothesized to improve classroom culture more than a pass/fail minimum 
competency exam.  
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8. Assess more difficult material.  Since CBEEES are supposed to measure and 
signal the full range of achievement in the subject, they contain more difficult questions 
and problems. This induces teachers to spend more time on cognitively demanding skills 
and topics.  MCEs, by contrast, are designed to identify which students have failed to 
surpass a rather low minimum standard, so they do not to ask questions or set problems 
that students near that borderline are unlikely to be able to answer or solve.8  This tends 
to result in too much class time being devoted to practicing low level skills.  
 
 The SAT-I and the ACT are not CBEEES because they are not curriculum-based, cover 
only a narrow slice of the high school curriculum and are not controlled by a Ministry of 
Education that funds education and sets the curriculum.  As Harvard’s admissions director put it 
shortly after the switch to the SAT-1, “Learning in itself has ceased to be the main factor [in 
college admissions].  The aptitude of the pupil is now the leading consideration 
(Gummere, 1943 p. 5).”  If students are admitted to selective colleges on the basis of aptitude 
and IQ (i.e. σ  is large in equation 2) not achievement [(w +θ) is small], student incentives to 
learn and community incentives to invest in school quality (IXm) are weakened and all students 
arrive in college less well prepared (Bishop 1999b).  Rick Harbaugh has shown that, if 
admissions decisions are centralized for all public institutions in a state or a nation, the central 
authority will choose to admit on the basis of knowledge and achievement (not aptitude) 
because this policy induces students to work harder in high school.   Leaving the selection of 
admissions criteria to colleges that are competing for students leads to “more emphasis on 
aptitude tests…and less emphasis on achievement tests and grades (2003 p. 1).” 
  Curriculum-based external exit exams (CBEEEs) increase w, the pecuniary rewards for 
absolute levels of academic achievement by improving the signals of the latent variable academic 
achievement made available to colleges and employers (Becker and Rosen 1992).  This causes 
these institutions to give greater weight to achievement when they make admissions and hiring 
decisions.  They also shift attention and rewards away from aptitude tests, measures of relative 
achievement such as rank in class and teacher grades, family connections, recommendations and 
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interviews toward measures of absolute achievement (eg. grades on the external exam).  The 
student’s rewards for achievement rise and the community benefits of increasing school quality rise 
even more, 
( )[ ]
( ) >∂
+∂
CBEEE
mm wjP ( )
( ) >∂
+∂
CBEEE
mm wj ( )
( ) .0CBEEE >∂
++∂ θwj
 First, community benefits of school 
quality increase more than the student’s private benefits because 
( )
( ) 0CBEEE <∂
∂ θ
.  Making better 
measures of L available reduces the weight attached to class rank and GPA in college and 
employer selection decisions.  Secondly, the education system’s sponsorship makes the CBEEE a 
highly visible signal of the school’s academic success and strengthens the hands of the local 
advocates for increased emphasis on the academic (as distinct from the artistic, athletic and 
vocational) goals of the school ( ) 0CBEEE >∂
∂P
.   Since organizations tend to get what they 
measure, it is very important that the Ministry use high quality exams that challenge students and 
induce good teaching.  
 3.1   Does Better Signaling of Achievement Result in Students Learning More?  
 The hypothesis that curriculum-based external exit examination systems improve 
achievement has been tested by comparing nations and provinces that do and do not have such 
systems.  Five different international data sets have been examined.  In most studies of the effect 
of CBEEES national mean test scores (for an age group or a grade) were regressed on per capita 
gross domestic product deflated by a purchasing power parity price index, a dummy for East Asian 
nation and a dummy for CBEEES.  Analyzing 1994-95 Third International Math and Science Study 
(TIMSS) data, Bishop (1996, 1997) found that 13 year old students from countries with medium 
and high stakes CBEEE systems outperformed students from other countries at a comparable 
level of economic development by 1.3 U.S. grade level equivalents (GLE) in science and by 1.0 
GLE in mathematics.   Analysis of data from the 1990-01 International Association for the 
Evaluation of Educational Achievement’s study of the reading literacy study of 14 year olds in 24 
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countries found that students in countries with CBEEES were about 1.0 GLE ahead of students in 
nations that lacked a CBEEES (Bishop 1999).  Analysis of data from both waves of TIMSS data 
collection also implies that CBEEES have highly significant effects (of about 1.5 GLEs) on the math 
and science achievement in 8th grade (Bishop 2003).   Analysis of PISA data presented in rows 1, 
4 and 7 of Table 3 also yields large statistically significant estimated effects of CBEEES on reading, 
mathematics and science literacy of native-born students. 
Two other studies (Ludger Wößmann (2000, 2002) and Hyea Sook Ryoo (2002) have 
conducted hierarchical analyses of the entire TIMSS and TIMSS-R micro data set and included a 
comprehensive set of controls for family background, teacher characteristics, school resources and 
policies at the individual and school level.  In Wößmann’s study the 8th graders in CBEEES nations 
were about 1.1 international grade level equivalents ahead in mathematics and about 0.8 
international grade level equivalents ahead in science.  He also found that learning gains between 
7th and 8th grade were significantly larger in CBEEES nations.   
Another five studies compare students living in different provinces/states in Germany, 
Canada and the United States.  Wößmann found that the German Lander with centralized 
secondary school exit examinations had significantly higher scores on the PISA literacy 
assessments.  Students attending school in Canadian provinces with CBEEES were a statistically 
significant one-half of a U.S grade level equivalent ahead in math and science of comparable 
students living in provinces without CBEEES (Bishop 1997, 1999a).   In 1990 New York State’s 
Regents exam system was the only example of a curriculum-based external exit exam system in 
the United States.  Graham and Husted’s (1993) analysis of 1991 SAT test scores in the 37 states 
with reasonably large test taking populations found that New York State students did much better 
than students of the same race and social background in other states.  Bishop, Moriarty and Mane 
(2000) confirmed Graham and Husted’s SAT findings and also found that 1992 NAEP math scores 
of New York 8th graders were significantly higher than in other demographically similar states. 
Analyzing NELS-88 data Bishop, Mane, Moriarty and Bishop (2001) found that New York students 
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learned about a half a GLE more between 8th grade and 12th grade than comparable students in 
other states.  By the middle of the 1990s another state, North Carolina, had established a 
CBEEES.  Controlling for ethnicity, social background and other standard’s based reform policies, 
8th graders in New York and North Carolina in 1996-98 were about one-half of a GLE ahead of 
comparable students in other states in reading, math and science.  State minimum competency 
exams had smaller non-significant effects on achievement (Bishop, Mane, Moriarty and Bishop 
2001).  
Table 3 
Academic Achievement in Nations with and without 
Curriculum-Based External Exit Examination Systems: 
Program for International Student Assessment 2000 Data 
Native Born Students Effort Index 
Curriculum-
Based 
External Exit 
Exam 
Log GDP/ 
Pop 
1995 
East Asia
Share 
Upper 
Secondary 
Students 
in CTE 
Adj R2
RMSE
# of  
Obs 
Mathematics—15 Yr Olds  39.9*** (12.1) 
84.9*** 
(7.9) 
36.6** 
(16.7)  
.764
32.7 41 
 19.6*** (6.6) 
38.2*** 
(11.0) 
86.2*** 
(7.2) 
12.8 
(17.1)  
.805
29.7 41 
 21.9*** (5.8) 
40.2*** 
(10.6) 
95.4*** 
(7.1)   
.807
29.6 41 
Science—15 Yr Olds  32.4*** (9.9) 
71.3*** 
(6.5) 
29.7** 
(13.9)  
.756
27.1 41 
 12.9** (5.7) 
31.2*** 
(9.4) 
72.1*** 
(6.2) 
14.2 
(14.9)  
.780
25.7 41 
 15.4** (5.1) 
33.5*** 
(9.8) 
71.4*** 
(6.2)   
.780
25.7 41 
Combined Reading Literacy —
15 Yr Olds  
25.2*** 
(8.8) 
76.6*** 
(5.6) 
15.7 
(11.9)  
.828 
23.1 41 
 3.7 (5.2) 
24.8** 
(8.9) 
76.9*** 
(5.6) 
11.2 
(14.6)  
.826
23.3 41 
 5.7 (4.6) 
26.7*** 
(8.6) 
76.3*** 
(5.6)   
.827
23.2 41 
School/College Enroll. of 15-19 
yr olds (percent)  
-5.7 
(4.8) 
13.1*** 
(4.3) 
-1.1 
(7.7) 
.18* 
(.10) 
.552
10.3 30 
Expected FTE Yrs of 
Schooling: 5-65  
-.11 
(.47) 
2.51***
(.40) 
.27 
(.73) 
.020* 
(.010) 
.700
1.10 32 
Upper-Secondary Graduation 
Rate  
4.9 
(6.9) 
27.2*** 
(4.5) 
14.3* 
(8.2) 
.23* 
(.12) 
.725
11.7 26 
  
 
Holding schools accountable also appears to increase student achievement.  States that 
introduced standards based reform programs during the 1990s-- annually reporting school data 
on achievement and rewarding successful schools and shaming schools that are not improving-
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-achieved larger gains in student achievement on the NAEP exams than states that did not 
pursue these policies (Hanushek and Raymond 2003, Carnoy and Loeb 2003).   Standard-
based reform had larger effects on Blacks and Hispanics than Whites.  Student stakes and 
school stakes appear to be complementary policies particularly at the secondary school level. 
3.2 Does Better Signaling of Achievement Strengthen the Academic Focus of 
Schools? 
 
What is the primary mechanism by which CBEEES increase student achievement?  Do 
they induce school districts to hire more qualified teachers, to devote more time to teaching core 
subjects, to assign more homework etc?  The impacts of CBEEES on school policies and 
instructional practices have been studied in the TIMSS data, in PISA data and in the Canadian 
International Assessment of Educational Progress data.  CBEEES are not associated with 
higher teacher-pupil ratios nor greater spending on K-12 education.  They are, however, 
associated with higher minimum standards for entry into the teaching profession, higher teacher 
salaries, a greater likelihood of having teachers specialize in teaching one subject in middle 
school and a greater likelihood of hiring teachers who have majored in the subject they will 
teach.  Teacher satisfaction with their job appeared to be lower, possibly because of the 
increased pressure for accountability that results from the existence of good signals of individual 
student achievement.  Schools in CBEEES jurisdictions devote more hours to math and science 
instruction and build and equip better science labs (Bishop 1997, 1999b). 
 Fears that CBEEES have caused the quality of instruction to deteriorate appear to be 
unfounded.  Students in CBEEES jurisdictions were less likely to say that memorization is the way 
to learn the subject and more likely to do experiments in science class.  Apparently, teachers 
subject to the subtle pressure of an external exam four years in the future adopted strategies that 
are conventionally viewed as "best practice," not strategies designed to maximize scores on 
multiple-choice tests.  Quizzes and tests were more common, but in other respects CBEEES 
jurisdictions were no different on a variety of indicators of pedagogy.  Students were more likely to 
get tutoring assistance from teachers after school.  They were just as likely to enjoy the subject and 
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they were more likely to believe that science is useful in every day life.  Canadian students did 
more homework and talked with their parents more about schoolwork (Bishop 1999b).   
 Advocates of external measurement of student achievement with important stakes attached 
argue that it will improve the functioning of decentralized education systems.   Parents will be better 
able to judge which schools are doing a good job.  The information will influence choice of school 
and strengthen competitive pressures for excellence.  Ministries of Education no longer need to try 
to improve education quality by rigidly specifying inputs—teacher qualifications, salaries, budget 
allocations and textbooks.  Instead, teachers and school administrators can be given authority to 
use their local knowledge about teacher talents and budget circumstances to maximize school 
quality.  Publishing data on achievement, it is theorized, creates accountability pressures that 
induce teachers and administrators to place greater emphasis on improving academic 
achievement.  Tests of these hypotheses have been supportive.  Bishop’s (1999a, 2000) analysis 
of IAEP data found that controlling on student background, math achievement of students in private 
schools was higher only in jurisdictions that required externally set diploma exams at the end of 
secondary school.  Analyzing TIMSS and PISA data, Ludger Wößmann (2002, 2003, 2004) found 
that school autonomy over salaries and teacher influence over course content, textbooks and 
budget allocations had positive effects on student achievement in nations with external exams.  In 
nations without external exams, by contrast, high levels of school and teacher autonomy were 
associated with lower student achievement.   This is a promising and very important line of 
research.   Since changes in school governance and autonomy are commonly proposed as a way 
to make schools more efficient, it is critical that we understand how the effects of school choice and 
autonomy are influenced by the measurement and signaling of student achievement.    
3.3 Does Better Signaling of Achievement Improve Student Behavior and 
Discipline? 
 
 Was attending more regularly and better discipline a mechanism by which CBEEES 
increased student achievement?  Apparently not, the student effort and discipline index was not 
significantly higher in nations with CBEEES.  When the effort/discipline index was added to the 
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model, the coefficient on CBEEES hardly changed (contrast rows 1 and 2 in each panel of Table 
3).  On the other hand, students in CBEEES jurisdictions did more homework, got more tutoring 
and were tested more frequently.   Possibly teachers responded to the external exam by assigning 
more homework and scheduling more students for tutoring.  Many researchers have described 
classrooms as regulated by implicit treaties between students and the teacher (Sizer 1984, Powell, 
Farrar and Cohen 1985).  External exams may allow teachers to require a higher standard of work 
from students but claim they are being forced to become tougher by the necessity to prepare them 
to pass the graduation exam.   More research on the mechanisms by which examination systems 
influence classroom interactions and student achievement is clearly needed.   
3.4 Does Better Signaling of Achievement Influence School Attendance and 
Labor Market Success? 
 
 What effects do high stakes curriculum-based external exit exam systems have on high 
school enrollment rates and college attendance?   This question was addressed by analyzing 
OECD data on school enrollment rates of 15 to 19 year olds, upper-secondary graduation rates 
and years spent in school [summed net-enrollment rates of people from age 5 to 65] (OECD 2000, 
Table C1.1).   Regressions predicting these variables are presented in rows 10, 11 and 12 of Table 
3.  CBEEES had no significant effect on any of these indicators.  The statistically significant 
predictors were per capita GDP and the share of upper-secondary students in pre-vocational and 
career-technical educational programs (Bishop and Mane 2004).  Analyses of U.S. state cross 
section data have also found that CBEEES (i.e. a dummy for New York State) and MCEs had no 
significant effect on aggregate enrollment rates or graduation rates in the early 1990s.  The total 
number Carnegie units required to graduate, however, was negatively related to enrollment rates 
and graduation rates (Bishop and Mane 2000; Lillard and DeCicca 2001).   
 The longitudinal NELS-88 data set allows a more refined look at the distributional effects of 
CBEEES and MCEs on high school completion.   Students with low or average GPAs in 8th grade 
were significantly more likely to get their diploma late or to get a GED when they were from New 
York or a state with an MCE.  The proportion of 8th graders who eventually got either a regular 
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diploma or a GED was no different in New York but significantly lower for low GPA students from 
other MCE states (Bishop, Mane, Moriarty and Bishop 2001).  As in Europe, fast paced instruction 
and high standards for getting an academic diploma results in some students taking longer to get 
the diploma and other students switching over to less demanding programs of study.   
 There is only one study of the effects of MCEs and CBEEES on college attendance in the 
United States.  When eighth graders in 1988 were followed up in the fall of 1993, those who lived in 
New York or a state with an MCE were (controlling for a host of student, school and labor market 
characteristics including the cost and payoff to college attendance) significantly more likely to be in 
college than students who attended school in other states (Bishop, Mane, Moriarty and Bishop 
2001). 
 Economic theory predicts that raising graduation standards will improve the average 
quality of high school graduates and raise their mean wage and earnings (Betts and Costrell 
2001).  Analysis of HSB and NELS-88 data support this prediction. Controlling on high school 
completion, college attendance and local labor market characteristics, students from states with 
MCEs earned significantly more--9 percent more in the calendar year following graduation-- 
than students from states without MCEs.  The MCE also helped recent graduates get jobs that 
offered better opportunities for training and advancement (Bishop, Mane, Moriarty and Bishop 
2001).  As a result, eight years after graduating from high school, those growing up in a MCE 
state earned between $1100 and $2000 per year more than those who had attended high 
school in a non-MCE state (Bishop and Mane 2005).    
 
IV.   Setting Higher Standards for Course Grades and Promotion to the Next Grade 
 Do higher expectations and tougher grading standards induce students to work harder and 
learn more?   Sociologists and psychologists have been studying this issue for decades.  Those 
taking more rigorous courses get lower grades but learn a good deal more (Gamoran and Barends 
1987).  Kulik and Kulik's meta analysis (1984) of the educational literature found that students 
chosen to skip a grade or to take an accelerated curriculum score 75 percent of a standard 
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deviation higher on tests a few years later than matched students who were not accelerated.  
Repeating a grade effectively lowers learning goals and reduces the retained child's achievement a 
few years later by about 30 percent of a standard deviation (Holmes 1989).    
 The goal setting literature is also relevant.  Wood, Mento and Locke’s (1987) meta analysis 
of experimental studies of the effect of goal difficulty on various kinds of achievement concluded 
that on highly complex tasks like school and college course work, specific hard goals raised 
achievement by 47 percent of a standard deviation relative to students instructed simply to “do your 
best.”  Achievement goes up, but so does the probability of failing to reach the goal.  In most 
studies more than two-thirds of those in the "hard goal" condition failed to achieve their goal (Locke 
1968 p. 163-165).   Will effort be sustained in the face of repeated failure? 
 In the laboratory and field settings used by psychologists, subjects have generally accepted 
the goal set for them by the researcher.  Stedry (1960) found, however, that when subjects who 
had already set their own goals were assigned even higher goals by the study director, they 
rejected the assigned goal and achievement did not rise.  Will students accept the goals that 
teachers set for the class?  Can, for example, teachers induce students to set higher learning goals 
by raising the learning target that students must achieve to get an A or a B grade?  Betts (2001), 
Betts and Grogger (2003) and Figlio and Lucas (2001) have addressed this question.  Grading 
standards were measured by comparing student test scores to the grades teachers awarded.  
Schools and teachers that gave better grades than predicted were classified as having low grading 
standards.  Worse grades than predicted classified the teacher as a tough grader.  In multivariate 
models controlling for characteristics of students and teachers, students in the tough grading 
standards schools/classrooms had significantly larger test score gains.  Aware that these results 
could be generated by unmeasured variations in teacher quality and grading on a curve, a series of 
robustness tests were conducted that tend to support the causal interpretation of the finding.    
 Figlio and Lucas have particularly rich data so their tests are the most convincing.  They 
have four years of longitudinal data and are able to match pupils to individual teachers for whom 
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they have good measures of grading standards.   Controlling for classroom composition and school 
and student fixed effects, they find that one year gains are about 20 percent greater in math and 
one-third greater in reading for students assigned to teachers who are tough graders.   They also 
found that parents spent 60 percent more time helping their child with homework when the child’s 
teacher was a tough grader.  This was probably one of the mechanisms by which students in the 
high standards classes learned more. 
 These parents did “not perceive tougher teachers to be better teachers (Figlio and Lucas 
2001 p. 20).”   Difficult homework assignments intrude on parents’ time and often put the family 
under stress, so parents complain.  This is one of the reasons why 30 percent of American 
teachers feel pressured "to reduce the difficulty and amount of work you assign and “to give 
higher grades than students' work deserves" (Hart 1995)."  When the only signal of student 
achievement is teacher grades, parents typically prefer high grades not high standards.   
Teachers who work in systems with external exams are aware of this.  When a proposal was put 
forward in Ireland to drop the nation’s system of external assessments and have teachers assess 
students for certification purposes, the union representing Ireland’s secondary school teachers 
reacted as follows:  
 Major strengths of the Irish educational system have been: 
 (i)  The pastoral contribution of teachers in relation to their pupils  
    (ii) the perception of the teacher by the pupil as an advocate in terms of nationally 
certified examinations rather than as a judge.  
 The introduction of school-based assessment by the pupil's own teacher for 
certification purposes would undermine those two roles, to the detriment of all 
concerned.... 
 The role of the teacher as judge rather than advocate may lead to legal 
accountability in terms of marks awarded for certification purposes.  This would 
automatically result in a distancing between the teacher, the pupil and the parent.  It 
also opens the door to possible distortion of the results in response to either 
parental pressure or to pressure emanating from competition among local schools 
for pupils.  (Association of Secondary Teachers of Ireland, Flyer, 1990, p.1). 
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Note how the Irish teachers union feared that switching entirely to internal assessment would 
result in teachers being pressured to lower standards.   If they are right, school choice does not 
inevitably lead to higher standards and better teaching.  Higher standards will result only if 
student achievement is externally assessed, the results of these assessments are published 
and students benefit from attending schools that set high standards. 
 Gresham’s Law of Course Selection:  American high schools offer courses in core 
subjects at vastly different levels of rigor and allow students to choose their level.   A good grade 
requires less work in the lower level classes so a Gresham’s law of course selection tends to 
prevail in which easy courses displace rigorous courses.  Admissions officers at elite colleges have 
reacted by telling prospective students to take rigorous courses and are factoring course rigor into 
their deliberations.  But most students do not aspire to attend elite colleges.   Community colleges 
admit just about everyone and send students into noncredit remedial classes if they do poorly on 
placement exams given to arriving students. State universities seldom formally consider course 
rigor in their formula driven admissions process.    
 Asian and European schools also allow students to choose lower standards options.  But 
the option chosen is well signaled to others by the name or type of secondary school or program.  
There is considerable prestige and honor attached to being in rigorous programs, so competition 
for admission to the most demanding programs is often fierce, particularly in Asia.  Once the school 
or program is selected, European students are typically formed into classes that take almost all 
subjects together.  The class often remains intact for a couple of years and friendships tend to 
develop within this class.  Students who are not able to keep up with the fast paced curriculum are 
asked to repeat the grade or to transfer to an easier school or an easier line of study.  When I 
asked a Dutch student who, despite long hours of study had been required to repeat a grade, why 
she had studied so hard, she responded, "I wanted to stay with my class!"  Apparently, trying to 
keep up academically (i.e. accepting the academic goals of the school) is viewed positively by 
peers because it is an expression of commitment to the group.  Indeed Dutch teachers and 
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students tell me it is common for some of the better students to help struggling students pass the 
courses they are having difficulty with.  
 While the threat of retention appears to have the intended incentive effects in Belgium, 
France, Netherlands and Germany, the institutional features that make it such a powerful 
incentive—the intimate class that takes all its courses together and stays intact multiple years—are 
absent in large American comprehensive high schools.  Failing a course only means it must be 
repeated during the summer or next year.  It does not push you out of your clique, so the incentive 
effects of the threat of retention are likely to be weaker in the U.S. than in Europe.  Furthermore, 
retention is very costly because keeping a student in school for an extra year costs taxpayers over 
$7000.  Compulsory summer school and after school programs appear to be a better, and less 
costly, alternative (Jacob 2002; Roderick, Bryk, Jacob, Easton and Allensworth 1999; Roderick, 
Engel and Nagaoka. 2003; Betts 1998.)  This is a policy issue that needs a great deal more 
research.   
  
V.   Peer Norms about Studying and Academic Engagement.  
  At most schools, students have developed strong independent sub-cultures that make 
highly prescriptive demands on group members—no squealing on classmates, for example.   In 
Philadelphia’s inner city secondary schools, the “code of the street” dominates:   
With each passing year the school loses ground as more students adopt a street 
orientation, if only for self defense in the neighborhood.  But often what is out on 
the streets is brought into the classrooms. The most troublesome students are 
then encouraged by peers to act out, to “get over on” the teacher, to test 
authority by probing for weaknesses (Anderson 1999 p.  94). 
 
While middle class schools have fewer disruptive students, peer support for their behavior is 
quite common.  The EEA survey found that 60 percent of students disagreed with the 
proposition that “it was annoying when other students talk or joke around in class.”   Based on a 
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multiyear study of nine high schools Laurence Steinberg, Bradford Brown and Sanford Dornbusch 
concluded that:  
The adolescent peer culture in [middle class] America demeans academic 
success and scorns students who try to do well in school....Less than 5 percent 
of all students are members of a high-achieving crowd that defines itself mainly 
on the basis of academic excellence...  Of all the crowds the ‘brains’ were the 
least happy with who they are--nearly half wished they were in a different crowd  
(1995, 145). 
 
 Where do such norms come from?  Kenneth Arrow has said that “norms of social 
behavior, including ethical and moral codes ….are reactions of society to compensate for 
market failure (Arrow 1971, 4).”  This “internalize externalities” explanation of norms would 
appear to predict a norm against class disruptions because such disruptions prevent classmates 
from learning.  Clearly this prediction fails.  Are there other externalities at work that can explain 
the peer culture’s toleration of disruptive students and it’s dislike of nerds.  The beginnings of an 
answer can be found by looking very closely at (3), the expression for the benefits of learning.  
Let’s ask: ‘How large a benefit do I derive from others studying harder?’  This can be calculated 
by taking the derivative of (3) with respect to Em holding E and Xm constant: 
12) My benefit from effort by classmates =  
mE
Bi
∂
∂
 = {(j+w)ρLi  − θαLm  + θρ(Li −Lm)}/Em 
When we ask “what is the effect of my study effort on aggregated learning payoffs of other students 
at the school’, we get an even simpler expression: 
13) Others payoff wrt  my effort  
= Ψ= im
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∂
= (jm +wm )ρ -  θα 
Note that both of these expressions are negative when θα is large and ρ is sufficiently small. 
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 Why are Nerds unpopular and targeted for harassment?    Equation 12 and 13 tells us 
that    students are made worse off by the studying of others when (a) most of the rewards for 
learning arise from how one is ranked relative to other students in the class [θ is large relative to 
(j+w)], (b) the elasticity of learning with respect to others effort (ρ) is much smaller than α, the 
elasticity of learning with respect to own effort and (c) the student is a slow learner (Li < Lm).   When 
many of the extrinsic rewards for learning depend on rank in class or grades calculated on a curve, 
students may come to believe they have a common interest in persuading each other “not to study 
too much.”   Evidence for this comes from the EEA survey, where those who strongly agreed that 
‘It is harder for me to get good grades, …if others study hard’ were three times more likely to have 
friends who ‘make fun of those who try to do well in school’ than those who disagree.  Thus the 
purpose of nerd harassment is not punishing high aptitude students for being smart, but 
discouraging study effort.   Indeed, pressure against doing all your homework or volunteering 
comments during class will probably be stronger in low track classes than high track classes 
because the students in low track classes are more likely to have chosen an identity that rejects 
school (Akerlof and Kranton 2002).   
 In Akerlof and Kranton’s very interesting theory a student’s primary motivation derives from 
his or her identity—jock, brain, burnout, party animal, etc.  Associated with each identity is an ideal 
type—stereotypical physical attributes and behaviors that characterize the members of the crowd.  
“Individuals then gain or lose utility insofar as they belong to social categories with high or low 
social status and their attributes and behavior match the ideal of their category (2002 p.1168).”  
Students with physical and social attributes that bring them close to the ‘ideal’ of a particular crowd 
tend to join that crowd.  Once you join a crowd you try to live the ideal.  Crowds tend toward 
homogeneity and discourage socializing with members of lower status crowds.  “The quality of a 
school depends on how students fit in a school’s social setting (p.1167).”  While they argue that the 
distribution of student identities (crowds) at a school and how they interact are more important 
Drinking from the Fountain of Knowledge                                                        CAHRS WP04-15 
 
 
Page 39 
determinants of learning than measurable school inputs, they do not put forward a set of policy 
prescriptions.  
 Akerlof and Kranton do not try to explain what determines the ideals and norms that 
characterize an identity, how new students learn the norms and are induced to conform to them 
and how norms evolve over time in response to changes in the environment and school policy.  
In three recent papers (Bishop et al 2003, 2004 and Bishop 2003b) my colleagues and I have 
constructed a rational choice theory (Olson 1965, Hechter 1987) of student peer group solidarity 
to address these questions.  Strong independent sub-cultures are mechanisms by which 
students produce and consume excludable jointly produced goods and services such as 
friendship, socializing, parties, interscholastic competition, respect, prestige and norms 
regarding academic effort.  The norms promoted by peer sub-cultures are sometimes in 
opposition to the rules and norms that principals, teachers and parents are trying to promulgate. 
For example, “sucking up” to teachers and rate busting are typically strongly discouraged just as 
they are in many work settings.  Students entering middle school learn its norms by trying to 
copy the traits and behaviors of students who are respected and avoiding contact with those 
who are frequently harassed.   
 Norms are directed at focal actions that are visible to other group members (or where a 
significant risk of discovery exists) and are enforced by sanctions (Coleman 1990, 246).  Since 
norm enforcement is a public good, peer groups must devise a means of inducing classmates to 
sanction those who violate peer norms.  Norms that survive the test of time typically impose two 
obligations: avoid focal action A and sanction group members who do A.   Aspirants for admission 
to high status crowds, ‘wannabes,’ are particularly sensitive to pressures to demonstrate their 
loyalty to group norms, so they are often the ones who harass norm violators.  Social norms that 
impose obligations on group members to enforce the norm powerfully replicate in later generations 
of the population and do so under quite general conditions.  Employing evolutionary game theory, 
Bendor and Swistak (2001) have shown that social norms enforcing cooperation in prisoner’s 
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dilemma games have a very robust ability to repel invasions by non cooperating intruders only 
when third parties (not just the victim of non-cooperation) are obligated to impose sanctions on 
deviant actors.   Fehr and Gachter’s (2000) four-person public goods experiments found that 
allowing players to punish those who contribute little to the public investment results in heavy 
punishments of free riders and a big reduction in free rider behavior.  Many players devoted some 
of their money to punishing norm violators even though punishing free riders was costly.  
Harassing a student who has violated peer norms is close to costless in American secondary 
schools and is indeed often rewarded (Bishop et al 2003).   
Since not conforming to the school’s norms generates harassment and social exclusion, 
one can infer the norms by noting who gets harassed and who doesn’t.  Traits that in EEA data led 
to higher risks of being bullied and harassed were: being in a special education, being in gifted 
programs, taking accelerated courses in middle school, tutoring other students, enjoying school 
assignments, taking a theatre course, saying that rap-hip hop is not your favorite music and 
preferring musicals, heavy metal, country, or classical music. The relationship between harassment 
and academic effort was curvilinear; both nerds and slackers were harassed. To some degree 
these norms are, as Kenneth Arrow and James Coleman have suggested, trying to internalize 
externalities.  But why does music preference predict harassment?   Why are student tutors 
victimized?   
We propose that school wide norms also have a “We’re cool, Honor us” function of 
legitimizing the high status that the leading crowds claim for themselves.  While norms tend to be 
passed from one generation to the next, the mass of students learn the norms by noting the 
example set by current members of the leading crowds.  If leaders of popular crowds spend more 
time on and are particularly talented at sports, extracurricular activities, hanging out and partying, 
the theory predicts that peer culture will give high priority to extracurricular and social 
achievements.  Academic norms will also reflect the interests of the leading crowds.  If state 
government introduces a tough graduation exam and leaders of the popular crowd fear they may 
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not be able to graduate if they do not study harder, study norms will rise.  If a new generation of 
leaders of the popular crowd aspires to go to the highly competitive flagship state university rather 
than a local college with open door admissions, study effort norms will rise.  The theory suggests, 
therefore, that peer norms are not immutable.  They adjust to changes in graduation requirements, 
school policies and the labor market and they are influenced by the values and abilities of the 
students who become leaders of a crowd.   
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Summary 
 Students face four decision margins: (a) How many years to spend in school, (b) What to 
study. (c) How much effort to devote to learning per year and (d) Whether to disrupt or assist the 
learning of classmates.   The thousands of studies that have applied human capital theory to the 
first two questions are reviewed elsewhere in this volume and the handbook series. This paper 
reviews an emerging economic literature on the effects of and determinants of student effort and 
cooperativeness and how putting student motivation and behavior at center of one’s theoretical 
framework changes one’s view of how schools operate and how they might be made more 
effective.   In this new framework students have a dual role.  They are both (a) 
investors/consumers who choose which goals (outputs) to focus on and how much effort to put 
into each goal and (b) workers getting instruction and guidance from their first-line supervisors, the 
teachers.  A simple model is presented in which the behavior of students, teachers and 
administrators depends on the incentives facing them and the actions of the other actors in the 
system.  The incentives, in turn, depend upon the cost and reliability of the information (signals) 
that is generated about the various inputs and outputs of the system.  Our review of empirical 
research, support many of the predictions of the model.  
 Student effort, engagement and discipline vary a lot within schools, across schools and 
across nations and have significant effects on learning.   Higher extrinsic rewards for learning are 
associated the taking of more rigorous courses, teachers setting higher standards and more time 
devoted to homework.  Taking more rigorous courses and studying harder increase student 
achievement.  Post World War II trends in study effort and course rigor, for example, are positively 
correlated with achievement trends.   
 Even though, greater rigor and higher standards improve learning, parents and students 
prefer easy teachers.  They pressure tough teachers to lower standards and sign up for courses 
taught by easy graders.  Curriculum-based external exit examinations improve the signaling of 
academic achievement to colleges and the labor market and this increases extrinsic rewards for 
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learning.   Cross section studies suggest that CBEEES result in greater focus on academics, more 
tutoring of lagging students, more homework and higher levels of achievement.   Minimum 
competency examinations do not have significant effects on learning or dropout rates but they do 
appear to have positive effects on the reputation of high school graduates.  As a result, students 
from MCE states earn significantly more than students from states without MCEs and the effect 
lasts at least eight years.    
 Students who attend schools with studious well-behaved classmates learn more.  
Disruptive students generate negative production externalities and cooperative hard-working 
students create positive production externalities.  Peer effects are also generated by the norms of 
student peer cultures that encourage disruptive students and harass nerds.  In addition learning is 
poorly signaled to employers and colleges.  Thus, market signals and the norms of student peer 
culture do not internalize the externalities that are pervasive in school settings and as a result 
students typically devote less effort to studying than the taxpayers who fund schools would wish.       
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1 The Educational Excellence Alliance is a consortium of schools and school districts that have 
administered the ED-Excel survey of student peer culture and received reports comparing their 
students’ responses to the responses at other comparable schools.   A total of about 325 schools and 
110,000 students have participated in the study (Bishop et al 2003).  
2 PISA assesses the cumulative educational experiences of all students at age 15 regardless of the grade 
levels or type of institution they are attending.   The students complete a 20 to 30 minute background 
questionnaire and a 90-minute assessment consisting of a mix of multiple choice, short answer, and 
extended response questions.  It’s most recent report (OECD 2003a) presents data on 222,948 
students from 43 nations accounting for one-third of the world’s population..  Great care is taken to 
insure that the schools and students who are assessed are representative of the all 15-year old 
students in the nation. 
3  Students were asked the frequency in their language arts class of: “the teacher has to wait a long time 
for the students to <quiet down>; students cannot work well; students don’t listen to what the teacher 
says; students don’t start working for a long time after the lesson begins; there is noise and disorder; 
and, at the start of class, more than five minutes are spent doing nothing.”  The response alternatives 
were ‘never’, ‘some lessons,’ ‘most lessons,’ and ‘every lesson.’   
4 The main necessary features of a more general model are that there is complementarity between 
individual student effort, school disciplinary climate and resource input in educational production and 
that certain institutional features enhance the productivity of resource usage.  
5 Observing how a worker performs on the job should allow employers to develop more accurate opinions 
about L over time.  There are, however, job and firm specific match components to job performance 
that may cloud an employer’s ability to evaluate general human capital.  Nevertheless, the difficulties 
of signaling L at the end of high school become less important to job placement and wages as the 
worker gains labor market experience.  But they nevertheless have very large effects on the choice of 
college, field of study and early entry into desirable occupations that have lasting effects on earnings 
even when better information on L later becomes available.  These early outcomes are particularly 
salient to students and parents and influence their expectations about the long run consequences of 
learning in high school (Rosenbaum 2001).  Their lack of knowledge about the true long term 
consequences may lead them to focus on manipulating the signals—SAT-1, class rank and GPA—that 
they know influence immediate outcomes and to neglect developing a really good education (Bishop 
1990).  
6 Pooling occurs when employers do not know which school a student has graduated from or when schools 
have not developed reliable reputations that employers and colleges can use to improve their prediction of 
L (Betts and Costrell 2001).  If grading standards of schools and of courses within schools were known, it 
might be feasible to handicap class rank and course grades so as to construct a good measure of L.  
Constructing such estimates for 100s of schools and tens of thousands of courses would be extremely 
costly.    Some employers and colleges use subjective judgments to handicap GPAs and class rank, but 
these judgments are unreliable and infrequently updated (Bishop 1999b).   
7 When grading standards vary across high schools, across classrooms within the school and over time, 
employers and universities are not able to place applicants for jobs or admission on a common scale, 
Students must be pooled together so schools and teachers have an incentive to help their students 
compete for jobs and colleges by inflating grades.   
8   In 1996 only 4 of the 17 states with MCEs targeted their graduation exams at a 10th grade proficiency 
level or higher.  Since the tests can be taken multiple times, eventual pass rates for the Class of 1995 
were often quite high: 98% in Louisiana, Maryland, New York, North Carolina and Ohio; 96 % in Nevada 
and New Jersey, 91% in Texas and 83% in Georgia. American Federation of Teachers, Making 
Standards Matter: 1996  (Washington, DC: American Federation of Teachers, 1996) p. 30. 
